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Data mining is well-known for its ability to extract concealed and
indistinct patterns in the data, which is a common task in the field
of cyber security. However, data mining is not always used to its
full potential among cyber security community. In this paper, we
discuss usability of sequential pattern and rule mining, a subset of
data mining methods, in an analysis of cyber security alerts. First,
we survey the use case of data mining, namely alert correlation and
attack prediction. Subsequently, we evaluate sequential pattern and
rule mining methods to find the one that is both fast and provides
valuable results while dealing with the peculiarities of security
alerts. An experiment was performed using the dataset of real alerts
from an alert sharing platform. Finally, we present lessons learned
from the experiment and a comparison of the selected methods
based on their performance and soundness of the results.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Information systems → Data mining; • Security and pri-
vacy → Intrusion detection systems;
KEYWORDS
data mining, cyber security, sequential pattern mining, sequential
rule mining, alert correlation, attack prediction
1 INTRODUCTION
Data mining is gaining a lot of attention recently in the field of
cyber security. A lot of recent research is dedicated to its application
in intrusion detection, where the data mining is performed over
network data such as packets or network flows [2]. Another inter-
esting use case for data mining is one level of abstraction higher,
in the processing of outputs of intrusion detection. In this case,
the interest is in finding patterns and sequences of events that are
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observable via intrusion detection systems. Thus, we can learn
about complex attacks including multi-stage attacks and advanced
persistent threats. Due to the growing popularity of information
sharing and collaborative intrusion detection, one may also observe
large-scale attacks or spread of an attack in a large network [34].
Further, given a typical attack progression, one can employ such
information to predict future events in the network traffic. In either
case, data mining is used to learn about patterns in security alerts,
which are otherwise hard to create. Namely, sequential pattern
mining fits the needs of cyber security analytics as the sequences
in the security alerts correspond to attack scenarios.
In this paper, we introduce our work on sequential pattern and
rule mining of cyber security alerts. The three main research ques-
tions and contributions of this paper are as follows:
(1) What are the use cases of sequential pattern mining in analysis
of cyber security alerts?
To this end, we survey related work to find the typical use cases of
data mining of cyber security alerts and identified its main appli-
cations. We extract approaches, methods, and algorithms used in
the literature to find out how deeply the cyber security research
community understands data mining and if suitable and efficient
methods are in use.
(2) Which approaches are the most suitable and effective for min-
ing sequences in security alerts?
Given the use cases and a dataset, we evaluated the existing data
mining approaches to find out which ones are most suitable from
the perspective of efficiency and soundness of results. We used a
dataset obtained from an alert sharing platform that contains a large
number of real-world attacks and alerts. Thus, we can go through
the whole process of sequence mining, from feature selection to
evaluation of results, to generate insights into the peculiarities of
cyber security data and its influence on sequence mining meth-
ods. An optimal sequence mining method should be effective and
provide sound, yet not obvious, results.
(3) What are the effects of optimizations and data reductions in
sequence mining of security alerts?
Finally, we would like to know which optimizations are worth
considering when using sequence mining in cyber security. Cyber
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security data is known for their variability and incompleteness,
which influences the results. Manymethods were proposed to select
only the most interesting results, e.g., by omitting patterns that
contained in larger patterns or selecting only top-K results by a
predefined parameter. Therefore, we evaluate and discuss these
optimizations to see which are useful for the given data.
The remainder of this paper is organized into six sections. In Sec-
tion 2, we present the related work and the use cases of sequential
pattern mining in the analysis of network security alerts. Section 3
lists and evaluates sequential pattern mining methods from the
perspective of the set use case. Section 4 describes the experimental
evaluation of the methods. The results are presented and discussed
in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper with lessons learned
and proposals for future work.
2 RELATEDWORK
We performed a systematic search for papers that mention data
mining in cyber security, namely data mining applied on security
alerts. Utilization of datamining in cyber security dates back to 1998,
when Lee and Stolfo [22] proposed using data mining for intrusion
detection. In this highly cited work, association rules and frequent
episodes were used to discover patterns that describe program or
user behavior. Recently, various use cases and utilizations of data
mining and machine learning in the field of cyber security were
surveyed by Buczak and Guven [2].
Many works have been published that use some data mining
method to analyze cyber security data. However, these papers typi-
cally use basic or well-known data mining methods and approaches
that are not necessarily the most suitable and efficient ones. To the
best of our knowledge, there is no paper dedicated specifically to
the problem of selecting the most suitable data mining method for
the purpose of cyber security alert analysis. Based on the related
work, we identified two main use cases for data mining in alert
analysis, alert correlation and attack prediction. The use cases are
presented in Table 1. For each related work, we include the proposed
use case, approach, algorithm, expected outputs, and evaluation,
if available. As we can see, association rule mining and frequent
episode mining are the most popular approaches. If an existing
algorithm or implementation is used, it is mostly Apriori or some
of its variants.
2.1 Alert correlation
One use case of sequential pattern mining is alert correlation, an
analysis process that takes the alerts produced by intrusion de-
tection systems and produces compact reports [33] by grouping
together individual alerts using logical relations between them [5].
Shin and Ryu [31] used association rule mining, frequent episode
mining, and clustering for the purpose of alert correlation. Time
window size and support values are discussed and the approaches
are evaluated using DARPA 1998 dataset. Dasgupta et al. [4] used
frequent episode mining to analyze security alerts from DARPA
2000 dataset. Some limitations, e.g., minimal confidence and maxi-
mal episode length, are mentioned, but the data mining component
is otherwise described very briefly as a part of a larger system.
Treinen and Thurimella [32] proposed a framework that applies as-
sociation rule mining in large intrusion detection infrastructures to
process alerts from intrusion detection systems. Shin and Jeong [30]
presented a data mining framework, which includes association
rule miner, frequent episode miner, and cluster miner. However, as
stated also in [6], the authors used inefficient algorithms for such
an application, e.g., Apriori algorithm to extract frequent episodes.
Li et al. [25] used sequential pattern mining in real time to find out
the frequency and sequence features of multi-stage attacks. In this
work, AprioriAll algorithm is used to construct a pattern graph and
the approach is evaluated using the DARPA 2000 dataset.
Alert filtering and sensor profiling are closely tied to alert corre-
lation. Clifton and Gengo [3] used sequential association mining,
specifically frequent episodes, to lower false positives in intrusion
detection. Their goal is to identify sequences of alarms caused by
normal operations based on preposition that a common sequence of
alerts is probably not the result of actual intrusion attempt. Manga-
naris et al. [27] brieflymentions sequential patterns as an alternative
to association rules in their work dedicated to adaptive alert filter-
ing and sensor profiling. Sequential pattern mining was proposed
as a future work.
2.2 Attack prediction
An advanced use case is an attack projection and prediction. In
this task, the sequential patterns are used to create models of at-
tackers’ behavior. The attacks are then compared to the models
and if a partial match is found, the possible future moves of an
attacker can be predicted. The models can take many forms, e.g.,
attack graphs or Markov models. Li et al. [24] and Lei et al. [23]
constructed attack graphs using data mining. Lie et al. used asso-
ciation rule mining, while Lei et al. used transaction database and
sequential pattern mining. Both works describe used data mining
algorithms. Farhadi et al. [6] used data mining to construct Markov
model as a mean of attack prediction. Association rule mining was
used and algorithms are provided. Similar approach was proposed
by Katipally et al. [19], but without any further description. Kim
and Park [20] used continuous association rule mining algorithm
(CARMA) to create sequential rules by applying attack thread and
attack session to sequential association rule for attack and threat
prediction. Recently, Jiang et al. [18] used association rule mining
on honeypot logs to predict suspicious network traffic present in
the honeypots.
3 APPROACHES TO SEQUENCE MINING
Background on sequence mining was presented by Agrawal and
Srikant in 1995 [1]. Since that time, many approaches and algo-
rithms were presented in the literature as surveyed by Mabroukeh
and Ezeife [26] or Mooney and Roddick [28]. With a growing num-
ber of methods and algorithms, it is hard to keep pace with the
field and to select the right method for a given use case. In this
section, we discuss how we enumerated a set of candidate methods
to be evaluated in an experiment. The selected methods are briefly
described.
3.1 Method selection
The first task was to select a set of candidate methods. We followed
the map of data mining algorithms provided at the web page of
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Table 1: Related work on using data mining in cyber security alert analysis
Authors Use case Approach Algorithm/Implementation Evaluated on
Clifton and Gengo [3] Alert correlation Frequent episode mining Query Flocks live data
Manganaris et al. [27] Alert correlation Association rule mining custom live data




KDD Cup 1999, DARPA
1998 dataset
Dasgupta et al. [4] Alert correlation Frequent episode mining custom DARPA 2000 dataset
Treinen and
Thurimella [32]
Alert correlation Association rule mining DB2 Intelligent Miner live data
Li et al. [25] Alert correlation Sequential pattern mining AprioriAll. DARPA 2000 dataset,
live data





Li et al. [24] Attack prediction Association rule mining custom DARPA 1999, DARPA
2000 datasets
Lei et al. [23] Attack prediction Sequential pattern mining custom live data
Farhadi et al. [6] Attack prediction Association rule mining custom DARPA 2000 dataset
Kim and Park [20] Attack prediction Continuous association
rule mining
- -
Jiang et al. [18] Attack prediction Association rule mining Apriori, FP-Growth live data
SPMF library1. The map serves as a guide and a decision tree that
helps to choose suitable data mining methods and algorithms.
On the top levels, we choose a motivation and the expected form
of results. Both of our use cases direct in the same way; we want to
discover interesting patterns in data and the patterns should be in
a form of sequential patterns or sequential rules. By selecting only
sequential patterns and rules, we omit the large area of association
rule mining, which was used a lot in related work. Thus, our first
proposal for the field of security alert analysis is switching from
association rule mining to sequential rule and pattern mining. Sim-
ilarly, sequence prediction algorithms were not considered for our
use cases, even though an attack prediction is one of our use cases.
Instead, sequential rule mining is proposed.
The next criterion by which we select candidate methods is
whether we want the results to include confidence or probability.
In this moment, our two use cases are diverging. While attack pre-
diction requires such information and, thus, should use sequential
rules, the alert correlation does not need such data and, thus, should
use sequential patterns.
Sequential patterns are a suitable output of data mining for alert
correlation. Further criteria include time constraints, dimensions,
and the volume of results. Timemight play a significant role in cyber
security, so we decided to evaluate both algorithms with and with-
out time constraints. On the other hand, multi-dimensionality is not
a concert in this work as we yet cannot identify more dimensions
of sequences consisting of security alerts. Thus, multi-dimensional
sequential pattern mining methods are not included in the evalua-
tion. Finally, the volume of results can be influenced by the selected
method, either using a top-K approach, compressing sequential pat-
terns or selecting other concise subset. We consider these options
as highly relevant to the use cases as they can improve utilization
1http://www.philippe-fournier-viger.com/spmf/map_algorithms_spmf_data_
mining097.png
of the outputs. Thus, top-K, compressing, closed, maximal, and
generator patterns are selected for evaluation.
Sequential rules are a desired output of data mining for the
purpose of attack prediction. Further criteria on selecting suitable
algorithms are information about profit, time constraints, limita-
tions to number of results, and redundancy of results. First, we have
no requirements on information about profit. Thus, high-utility se-
quential rule mining methods were not considered. These methods
could be used in a situation, in which we could calculate the cost
of an attack and value of targets. This could be a topic of future
work in the field of cyber situational awareness, but is not further
considered in this paper. Second, methods with time constraints
will be subject to experimental evaluation, thus they are added to
the candidate method set. Similarly, top-K approaches filter out
the most interesting rules. Finally, the problem of redundancy was
not encountered in our or related work. Thus, method enhance-
ments dealing with redundancy in results were not included in the
experiment.
3.2 Methods in details
In the previous section, we selected a set of candidate methods,
which are described here in details. In total, we identified seven
sequential patternminingmethods and three sequential rule mining
methods.
Sequential pattern mining is looking for sequential patterns
(subsequences) which often occur in an input sequential database;
these patterns are called frequent [26]. Sequential database contains
set of sequences where sequence is consecutive list of itemsets. The
support of sequential pattern is a number of sequences where the
pattern occur divided by total number of sequences contained in
an input database. Pattern is considered as frequent if support of
the pattern is not smaller than a user defined minimal support.
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Top-K sequential patterns differs in the selection of patterns.
Determining the value of minimal support can be difficult, because
an unsuitable choice can cause algorithms to be very slow and
generate extremely large amount of patterns or generate none or
too few patterns. In the top-K algorithms, there is no need to define
minimum support value. Top-K algorithms discover kmost frequent
patterns for a user defined k [8].
Sequential pattern mining often generates lots of patterns with
redundant information. For example, for very long frequent pattern
there has to be also generated every subsequence of the pattern as
a unique pattern, because every subsequence has to have support
at least same as the original pattern. There are several methods
addressing this problem as closed, maximal and generators patterns,
which generate concise subset of all frequent patterns.
Closed sequential pattern mining is an optimization of se-
quential patternmining that filters results contained in other results.
A pattern is called frequent closed pattern if there is no superse-
quence with the same support [7].
Maximal sequential pattern mining is another optimization
that aims at reducing the number of results. A pattern is called fre-
quent maximal pattern if there is no supersequence that is also fre-
quent [14]. A detailed comparison of closed and maximal sequential
pattern mining can be found in the work by Mabroukeh et al. [26].
Sequential generator patterns is another optimization aiming
at filtering results within results. A pattern is called frequent gen-
erator pattern if it has no subsequence with the same support [10].
Compressing sequential patterns come with alternative in-
terestingness measures that address the redundancy issue (many
patterns with very similar meanings are generated). The GoKrimp
algorithm generate non-redundant patterns based on minimum
description length principle [21]. An advantage of this approach
is that there is no need to set input parameters and it generates
patterns that significantly compress the data.
Sequential pattern mining with time constraints extends
patterns with information about interval between itemsets and
allow users to define time constraints that reduce number of gener-
ated patterns. There are two kinds of item interval measurements,
item gap and time intervals [17]. Item gap is defined as number
of itemsets between successive itemsets in pattern. Time interval
requires time extended database where every itemset has assigned
value representing time of occurrence so the time interval between
two itemsets is defined as length of time between the occurrences of
the itemsets. Pattern mining with time intervals is able to generate
more precise patterns than pattern mining with item gaps [17]. We
used sequential pattern mining with time intervals, because the
time information is available to us.
Sequential rule mining produces rules in the form of implica-
tion A⇒ B where set of items A is followed by set of items B [12].
Rules have support value same as patterns, but unlike patterns also
offers the probability of confidence that items A will be followed by
the items B. Confidence of a rule A⇒ B is number of sequences in
which the rule appears divided by number of sequences in which
appear items from itemsetA. This is the reason why sequential rules
are more useful for doing predictions. Mining sequential rules re-
quires defining values for minimal support and minimal confidence
on the basis of which will be generated rules.
Top-K sequential rule mining is similar to top-K sequential
pattern mining. Determining values for input parameters as mini-
mal support and minimal confidence can be difficult, because, based
on the choice of these parameters, the algorithms can be very slow
and generate extremely large amount of rules or generate none or
too few rules. Top-K algorithms address this problem by generating
top k rules with maximum support for user defined k [13].
Sequential rule mining with window constraint finds rules
that appearswithin a sliding-windowwhose size is user defined [15].
This means that a rule occurs in a sequence only if the number of
items in the sequence between the first and the last item from the
rule is not bigger than the user defined window size.
4 EXPERIMENT SETUP
To compare the existing approaches, we performed an experiment
in which we applied selected data mining approaches to the dataset
of security alerts. In this section, we describe the dataset, the process
of creation of the sequential databases, and the results of applying
the methods presented in the previous section.
A general process of data mining goes as follows [2]. First, we
have to identify class attributes (features) and classes from training
data. Second, we have to identify a subset of the attributes neces-
sary for classification (i.e., dimensionality reduction). Then, we can
finally run the data mining algorithms. The two preliminary steps
are demonstrated on a real-world dataset.
We created a set of scripts in python to process the dataset,
build the databases, run the data mining algorithms, and format
the results. The scripts are publicly available on GitHub2.
4.1 Dataset
To evaluate the existing approaches, we used a dataset obtained
via cyber security alert sharing platform SABU3. Our platform
exchanges security alerts among participating networks, mostly
campus networks associated with CESNET, national research and
education network of the Czech Republic. Various alert sources are
deployed in participating networks. Most of the alerts are raised by
network intrusion detection systems and honeypots. Typical alerts
include reports of network scanning, brute-force password attacks,
exploit attempts, etc.
We extracted alerts shared during one week. In total, we got
16 million security alerts. The alerts are formatted in IDEA4, an
extensible data exchange format inspired by IDMEF and suited for
the needs of SABU platform. Each alert contains at least a timestamp
and a category of a reported event. Depending on the event type,
information on event source, target, or both are provided. These
information typically include IP addresses, ports, protocols, and
other network identifiers.
It is worth noting that the dataset and IDEA format have several
distinct features. The alerts were collected mostly from network-
based intrusion detection systems. Thus, almost all the alerts include
network identifiers of attack source and target, i.e., IP addresses
and ports. Unlike other security alert formats, IDEA has its own
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Table 2: Sequential databases
Database Sequences Unique items
Source and Target IPs with ports 9,571,703 76,131
Source and Target IPs without ports 9,571,703 7
Source IPs with ports 1,407,113 76,135
Source IPs without ports 1,407,113 10
Target IPs with ports 6,331 76,135
Target IPs without ports 6,331 7
the mandatory field. Another difference from other formats is the
mandatory timestamp of an event. While timestamp of actual start
of an event is generally preferred, IDEA considers the timestamp
of detection as mandatory due to practical deployment. Many in-
trusion detection systems have a problem extracting actual starting
time of an event, while the time of detection is always known.
4.2 Feature selection and database preparation
In the first step of pattern mining over the dataset, we selected
the features to extract. We included two mandatory fields of alerts,
category of an event and timestamp of event detection. Then, we
added source and target identifiers, source and destination IP ad-
dresses and target port. Source IP address was present in almost
every alert and 200,000 alerts missed target IP address. Source port
is not particularly useful, but the target port was missing in 500,000
alerts. The aforementioned entries are the solid base for feature
selection. Other data entries were considered as well, e.g., proto-
col and number of network connections, but they were sparsely
present in the alerts than the basic 5-tuple. When the features to
extract were selected, we created sequential databases, with which
the sequential pattern mining algorithms can work.
Sequential databases can be viewed from several perspectives.
In this work, we chose a perspective of source-target interaction.
Thus, a sequential database contains either sequences of events
between a source and a target, or sequences of events that share
just one of these values. We created a sequential database for each
of these cases. Summary of the resulting sequential databases is
available in Table 2. The events were aggregated by the IP addresses.
The sequences were then sorted by the event timestamps. Alerts
with missing IP addresses or ports were not used. Items in the
databases consisted either of event categories or pairs of event
category and target port.
Sequential database with time intervals is a special case of
sequential database, in which the itemsets in sequences are ex-
tended by a number representing information about time. For each
sequential database presented above, we created its variant with
time intervals. The numbers of sequences and unique items in the
databases are the same as in the basic sequential databases presented
in Table 2. The important step in creating the sequential database
with time intervals is setting the unit of time. In our case, we chose
5 minutes, so the alerts that appeared within same 5 minute interval
was aggregated into the same itemset. The reason for this is that
majority of the intrusion detection systems contributing to the alert
sharing platform uses 5-minute time window for raw data analytics.
Having in mind that the alert timestamps represent the time of
Table 3: Approaches and algorithms
Approach Algorithm(s)
Sequential pattern mining CM-SPADE [7]
Top-K sequential pattern mining TKS [8]
Closed sequential pattern mining CM-ClaSP [7]
Sequential generator pattern min-
ing
VGEN [10]




Sequential pattern mining with
time constraints
HirateYamana [17]




Sequential rule mining RuleGrowth [12]
Sequential rule mining with win-
dow constraints
TRuleGrowth [15]
Top-K sequential rule mining TopKRules [13]
detection, i.e., the end of the processing time window, it is common
to have time differences between alerts in the dataset in multiples
of 5 minutes.
Due to computational and memory complexity of some sequen-
tial pattern mining algorithms, we had to reduce the volume of
sequential databases. Random sampling of sequences was used in
favor of selecting shorter time interval of alert collecting. The moti-
vation for this was to be able record long-term patterns. Additional
test showed that, in our case, pattern sampling had only minimal
effect on the results, i.e., found patterns and support values.
4.3 Data mining algorithms
In this work, we used SPMF [9], an open-source data mining library.
SPMF specializes in pattern mining and implements all the methods
we want to evaluate, unlike other data mining tools and libraries,
e.g., Weka [16]. SPMF is a well-known library in the data mining
community and can be considered as an exemplary implementation
of the methods. We selected a set of suitable sequence mining
methods in Section 3.2. All methods are implemented in SMPF,
typically with more than one algorithm. Thus, we had to also select
an algorithm and its implementation, typically we picked the most
efficient one or at least the most recent one. A list of selected
algorithms for each approach is presented in Table 3.
5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we present and discuss results of an experiment.
First, we show how the selection of database influenced algorithm
efficiency. Then, a comparison of sequence mining algorithms is
presented. Some interesting results are presented next to illustrate
how sound the results are.
To begin with, we discuss several aspects of the dataset we used.
Using the data from real environment instead of an artificial dataset
showed some practical limitations of sequence mining of cyber
security alerts. As we show in the following sections, many al-
gorithms had troubles processing the full dataset and we had to
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Figure 1: Persistence of attackers (unique IP addresses). The
figure shows how many attackers were seen for how long.
reduce the database volume by sampling the data. We would like to
emphasize that the data from a whole week were used to discover
long sequences, e.g., attackers that are active for several days. As
we can see on Figure 1, the majority of attackers were active for
one day. However, the long tail of attackers active for several days
should be taken into account. These long tails might to illustrate
the differences between general sequence mining approaches and
the approaches with time constraints. Thus, we went for random
sampling instead of shortening the time interval in case of too long
computing times. The detailed results, including computation times
and database volume and sampling, are presented in Table 4.
5.1 Performance evaluation
The first criterion in our evaluation is performance of sequence
mining approaches. We were looking for a method that computes
the task in reasonable time on commodity hardware (Intel Xeon
E5520, 8 threads, 16 GB RAM). No prior estimates were set, but
during the experiment, we encountered computing times ranging
from one minute to one hour. In many cases we had to reduce the
database size to be able to finish computation in under an hour.
As we found out, performance is heavily influenced by com-
position of input data, which stresses the importance of feature
selection. The first general observation is that the algorithms per-
formed better over all the databases without ports compared to
databases with ports. Naturally, adding ports into the selected fea-
tures creates more unique items to work with.
The most complex database containing both sources and targets
was evaluated first. When we used the database without ports, the
proposed methods behaved quite well. Sequential pattern mining
and sequential rule mining algorithms were able to finish the com-
putation in reasonable time. When the database with ports was
used, the reduced database had to be used for all the sequential
pattern mining algorithms except sequential pattern mining with
time constraints. Sequential pattern mining methods with time con-
straints are working with different databases, where the alerts are
aggregated by 5-minute intervals, thus having shorter sequences
in general. Sequential rule mining algorithms were able to process
the full database with ports.
The databases with sources allowed slightly better computation
times for all the rule mining methods, but significantly worse for
compressing pattern mining and pattern mining with time inter-
vals. Most of the algorithms performed well when the database
without ports was used, but we had to apply database reduction for
compressing sequential pattern mining. Closed sequential pattern
mining with time constraints was distinctively slower in compar-
ison to others methods. When we switched to the database with
ports, we had to reduce the database for the sequential pattern
mining algorithms except for pattern mining with time constraints.
Sequential rule mining algorithms had no issues working with the
database with ports.
The most problematic was the database containing sequences ag-
gregated only by target IP address and port. No algorithm was able
to finish in reasonable time (less than 1 hour), even after database
reduction. The reason was that the database contained low number
of long sequences. The input of 16 million events was grouped into
6,331 sequences.
A general observation is that sequential rule mining algorithms
performed significantly better than sequential pattern mining algo-
rithms. We did not have to reduce a single database for sequential
rule mining. The algorithms behaved well in all cases and did not
make a difference between the databases with and without ports.
The only exception was the database containing targets with ports,
on which all methods failed even with database reduction. If a data-
base without ports was used, then the sequential pattern mining
algorithms were able to finish in reasonable time. Sequential pat-
tern mining methods varied in computing time, but the common
trend is that with higher data complexity, the computing time is
longer, often including database reduction. The most problematic
was compressing data mining with the highest demands even after
database reduction to 1 % of original size.
5.2 Comparison of sequence mining
algorithms
The second criterion in the comparison of the sequence mining
approaches is the usability and comprehensibility of their outputs.
Generally speaking, we want the methods to produce adequate
number of results with sufficient support and confidence values
and without much duplicities and ambiguous information.
Results with low support and confidence values are not convinc-
ing for an application in practice. For example, attack prediction
could effectively use sequential rules with confidence of at least
50 % to select the most possible future move of an attacker. On the
other hand, confidence approaching 100 % would indicate obvious
results that could be obtained by much simpler methods than data
mining.
Similarly, the number of results and their ambiguity plays a
significant role. If a low k in top-K methods or high support and
confidence thresholds are used, then there is a risk of having very
low number of obvious results. On the other hand, receiving too
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Table 4: Performance-based usability of sequential pattern and rule mining approaches
Database
Sources and Targets Sources only Targets only
Method without ports with ports without ports with ports without ports with ports
Sequential pattern mining 16 min, 100 % <1 min, 1 % 2 min, 100 % <1 min, 5 % $ $
Top-K sequential pattern mining <1 min, 100 % <1 min, 10 % <1 min, 100 % <1 min, 10 % $ $
Closed sequential pattern mining 3 min, 100 % 2 min, 20 % 2 min, 100 % 2 min, 50 % 2 min, 5 % $
Sequential generator pattern min-
ing
<1 min, 100 % <1 min, 10 % <1 min, 100 % <1 min, 10 % 6 min, 60 % $
Maximal sequential pattern mining <1 min, 100 % <1 min, 10 % <1 min, 100 % <1 min, 10 % 4 min, 60 % $
Compressing sequential pattern
mining
15 min, 100 % 3 min, 1 % 18 min, 10 % 4 min, 1 % <1 min, 1 % $
Sequential pattern mining with
time constraints
5 min, 100 % 6 min, 100 % 16 min, 100 % 11 min, 100 % <1 min, 100 % $
Closed sequential pattern mining
with time constraints
11 min, 100 % 11 min, 100 % 57 min, 100 % 34 min, 100 % 2 min, 100 % $
Sequential rule mining 1 min, 100 % 3 min, 100 % <1 min, 100 % <1 min, 100 % <1 min, 100 % $
Sequential rule mining with win-
dow constraints
2 min, 100 % 4 min, 100 % 1 min, 100 % 1 min, 100 % <1 min, 100 % $
Top-K sequential rule mining 1 min, 100 % 3 min, 100 % <1 min, 100 % <1 min, 100 % <1 min, 100 % $
The results show computation time in minutes and size of the input data in percentage of the original database. Com-
putation that did not complete or that generated excessive amount of patterns are marked with$.
much results would prevent their application in practice, as there
is high risk of bogus or misleading patterns. In addition, shorter
patterns may be discovered alone and as a part of a larger pattern,
thus creating uncertainty for a potential user of the results. Often
we had to manipulate threshold of support value to get a reasonable
number of patterns. We managed to find support thresholds that
lead to at least 5, but no more than 50, patterns.
For sequential pattern mining algorithms, we were able to
choose a reasonable minimal support value to discover around
40 patterns. The problem was with the target databases without
ports, which contain large numbers of patterns (up to thousands)
with the same support value. Thus, setting the minimal support
was a difficult task as we either got too few or too much patterns.
Even the top-K method was not able to address this problem as the
results contained all the patterns from a group with the same sup-
port. However, closed, generator, and maximal sequential pattern
mining methods were able to address this problem and generated
reasonable number of results. As mentioned before, the database
with targets with ports was problematic due to performance issues.
All methods failed even if the database was significantly reduced.
Nevertheless, these results serve only as a baseline for comparison
of advanced approaches.
The problem of redundancy in sequential patterns has been
mentioned in the method description. Many redundancies were
found in the results, prime example is a continuous scanning activity
of a single attacker. In this case, network scanning is performed over
and over, often up to dozens of times in a row. Sequence mining
methods thus create sequences consisting of a variable number of
network scanning alerts and nothing else. The longer the sequences
are, the rarer they are. Thus the support values of long sequences
are decreasing. We illustrate this observation in Figure 2.
The problem with such sequences is that they describe similar
behavior of an attacker in a large number of patterns. Often only one














Figure 2: Decreasing support in closed sequential patterns
containing network scanning alerts.
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of the patterns is enough for practical use. Further, other interesting
results may get lost in the numbers of such patterns when being
processed by a human. Closed, maximal, and generator pattern
mining algorithms should overcome this issue. Closed and generator
pattern mining provided the same results over all the databases,
even if we had to reduce the database due to performance issues.
However, the results did not differ from the basic sequential pattern
mining. On the other hand, maximal sequential pattern mining
significantly reduced the number of patterns generated for same
minimal support value, e.g., from 40 to 16 when mining from the
database containing sources only. However the redundancy still
exists in maximal patterns in the form of repeating the same event
which is sometimes interleaved with different event. For example,
there was a pattern containing six consecutive scans on port 23
whichwere interleavedwith scanning on port 2323. For this case, we
generated seven patterns that differ just in the position of scanning
of port 2323. In conclusion, closed and generator sequential pattern
mining methods did not prove to have an impact on the results,
but maximal sequential pattern mining method filtered the results
significantly, although not completely.
The particular values ofminimal support differ among the databa-
ses. For databases with sources and targets, the minimal support
of 0.01 was suitable. For databases with sources only, the adequate
minimal support was different among databases with ports (0.1)
and without ports (0.05). For database with targets only, we used
minimal support values varying around 0.3.
Compressing sequential pattern mining algorithm had the
biggest performance problems and in the half of the cases did not
find any pattern. If some patterns were found, they were similar to
patterns found by other methods. Still, the performance issues and
lacking results make this method unsuitable.
Sequential patternminingwith time constraints addsmore
information about the timing in discovered patterns and allows
users to define time constraints that reduce the number of gener-
ated patterns. As we are mainly interested in additional information
about time, we do not set any constraints. We selected 5-minute
interval as a unit of time due to typical settings of sensors contribut-
ing to our dataset, which usually detect security events in 5-minute
time windows. We found around 40 patterns in every database,
except databases with targets only. Typical time differences were
either none (simultaneous events) or multiples of 12, i.e., units of
hours. This is not surprising and confirms the soundness of the
results. Otherwise, the results are very similar to results of methods
that do not involve time intervals. No differences were found af-
ter comparing basic sequential pattern mining with time intervals
with closed sequential pattern mining with time intervals. However,
closed pattern mining was always slower than the basic pattern
mining. In conclusion, knowing the time intervals between events
in a pattern is an interesting feature to have, but minor performance
issues were found, which may outweigh the benefits.
Sequential rule mining algorithms showed interesting dissim-
ilarities in results. First of all, they discovered probably the most
appealing results of all methods, especially when the ports were
included in the database. In such case, various rules were found for
attackers that perform scanning over a combination of ports. These
results also had high support and confidence values. For example,
top-10 sequence rule mining over the database with sources and
ports had the following results:
Scan.1755 ==> Scan.1723 #SUP: 0.00025 #CONF: 0.69553
Scan.37777 ==> Scan.8000 #SUP: 0.00024 #CONF: 0.38748
Scan.1723 ==> Scan.1755 #SUP: 0.00023 #CONF: 0.35531
Scan.3392 ==> Scan.3391 #SUP: 0.00034 #CONF: 0.27006
Scan.3390 ==> Scan.3389 #SUP: 0.00024 #CONF: 0.10841
Scan.443 ==> Scan.80 #SUP: 0.00080 #CONF: 0.09309
Scan.80 ==> Scan.443 #SUP: 0.00066 #CONF: 0.02521
Scan.3389 ==> Scan.3390 #SUP: 0.00039 #CONF: 0.02226
Scan.2323 ==> Scan.23 #SUP: 0.00210 #CONF: 0.02031
Scan.23 ==> Scan.2323 #SUP: 0.00322 #CONF: 0.00461
Rules with confidence (#CONF) around 70% were found in other
databases as well. However, due to a disproportion between the
number network scanning alerts and alerts of other events, there is
also a gap in results between scanning and other types of events.
There are high confidence rules for various combinations of port
scanning, but there is very low confidence (<0.01) for rules begin-
ning with scan and ending with other event type, e.g., Scan ==>
Exploit. On the other hand, surprising rules with appreciable confi-
dence values, e.g., Anomaly ==> Exploit with confidence around
0.13. In conclusion, sequential rule mining provides highly valuable
results and has no performance issues.
We used window size of 5 in sequential rule mining with window
size. In most cases, the results were exactly the same as in common
sequential rule mining but, for the databases with sources, a smaller
number of rules was generated. Unlike sequential rule mining, the
longer rules were missing in the results.
5.3 Further results
Although we were primarily not interested in the actual results of
data mining results, we list some of them in this section to show
how accurate and predictable the results are. Relaying on time
efficient, yet inaccurate, method with misleading results would
cause more problems than good. Thus, we discuss how perspective
are the results from the security practitioner’s perspective.
A common result is a network scanning pattern in which a
combination of ports is scanned by a single scanner. For example, a
scan of port 80 is often accompanied by a scan of port 443. In this
case, a scanner is looking for web servers running either HTTP or
HTTPS. Similarly, port 23 and 2323 are scanned together due to
system administrators, who often move a well-known service, e.g.,
Telnet, to an unusual port to avoid scanning. However, this practice
is so common that scanners adapt to this by scanning both ports
at once. We found such port combinations in the outputs of most
sequence mining methods.
The most frequently found port combination in network scan-
ning patterns included ports 23 and 2323. This combinations were
found by most methods with high support and confidence. When
the time intervals were taken into account, it turned out that the net-
work scanning events were rather simultaneous then consequent.
However, there are typically higher support values for patterns (23,
2323) then in an opposite direction, for example:
Scan.23 -> Scan.2323 #SUP: 0.00325
Scan.2323 -> Scan.23 #SUP: 0.00217
As for the other port combinations, ports 80 and 443 were found
by most of the methods. Naturally, top-K methods found more
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interesting combinations. For example, top-K sequential rule min-
ing discovered combinations of ports 1755 and 1723 (confidence
69.55 %), 37777 and 8000 (confidence 38.75 %), and 3392 and 3391
(confidence 27 %).
Another interesting finding is the presence of patterns describing
repeated scanning. Closed sequential pattern mining and sequential
generator pattern mining excelled in this task and revealed that this
is more commonwith not so often scanned ports.While ports like 80
and 23 were scanned mostly just once by an attacker, the sequential
pattern mining revealed a group of ports that the attackers scanned
up to six times, e.g., ports 666, 674, 922, and 930. These ports are
used by various backdoors, which would explain the patterns. The
scanner could be a botnet center trying to keep in touch with the
bots. Even more interesting finding was that sequential rule mining
revealed that the four ports are often scanned together from the
same source. Although the support is low, confidence over 50 % is
a promising result. An example output is as follows:
(Scan.922, Scan.674) ==> Scan.930
#SUP: 0.02075 #CONF: 0.53690
(Scan.922, Scan.666) ==> Scan.930
#SUP: 0.02003 #CONF: 0.53096
In a related work, Panjwani et al. [29] denote that 50 % of attacks is
preceded by scanning. Many sequences (patterns and rules) were
found to describe network scanning followed by exploit attempt of
brute-force password attack. However, we could not confirm nor
disprove the 50% ratio due to significant overwhelm of scanning
alerts in our dataset leading to low support and confidence values of
corresponding patterns and rules. However, sequence mining raised
further questions with regard to scanning and network attacks. For
example, our results indicate that 62 % of attackers repeats scanning
at least once. Thus, an interesting research question for future work
would be the number of network scans before an intrusion attempt
or other type of attack.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
We surveyed and evaluated methods of sequential pattern and rule
mining and applied them to the analysis of cyber security alerts. To
the best of our knowledge, we are the first to evaluate suitability of
various data mining methods for this task, focusing on sequence
mining. Contrary to previous works, we also evaluated the ad-
vanced and optimized methods. This section concludes the paper
with lessons learned from the experiment and recommendations
for cyber security community on using sequence mining in prac-
tice. Subsequently, we propose the future work in the field. Source
codes of the scripts used in the experiment are publicly available.
Unfortunately, publishing the dataset is problematic as it is based
on actual security alerts and, thus, requires proper anonymization
and annotation as well as legal compliance.
6.1 Lessons learned
The lessons learned are divided into three groups according to the
research questions stated in introduction.
1) Use cases and method selection are the first problems to
approach when one wants to use data mining. Although association
rule mining and frequent episode mining were used in most of the
related work, we consider sequence mining as a better choice for
processing cyber security alerts. We would recommend sequential
pattern mining for alert correlation and sequential rule mining for
attack prediction. Thus, to wrap up our recommendation:
• Sequential pattern mining is suitable for alert correlation
use cases; the results are more comprehensive than with
association rule mining and frequent episode mining.
• Sequential rule mining fits attack prediction use cases; con-
fidence value can be directly used in a prediction model.
2) Performance, namely computation time, is a serious issue
in security alert processing since these are often considered as big
data, especially in collaborative environment. In our experiment, we
found that the feature extraction influences the computation time
and the results more than a selectedmethod. The evaluatedmethods
were able to efficiently mine patterns in sequences of alerts sharing
the same source and target or source only. On the other hand,
sequences of events with the same target were so long (thousands
of itemsets) that they practically prevented pattern mining. If ports
were included in the databases, we had to reduce the database
size by random sampling to achieve reasonable computation times.
Similarly, adding time criteria in the computation led to worse
performance results. No effect on performance was observed when
using specialized approaches like top-K or closed pattern mining.
Sequential rule mining showed no performance issues with the
only exception of database of targets with ports. Thus, our lessons
learned are:
• Most of the sequential pattern mining methods provide sim-
ilar results. The same applies for sequential rule mining.
• Feature selection makes the biggest difference; select them
carefully.
• Beware of too long sequences; existing methods cannot work
with them efficiently.
• Using optimized sequence mining methods (top-K, closed
patterns, etc.) has positive impact on performance as well as
on soundness of results.
• Sequence rule mining algorithms are much faster than se-
quential pattern mining algorithms. If efficiency is a require-
ment, we may consider using them even for alert correlation.
3) Soundness of results and used optimizations is hard to
formalize and has to be approached with a good knowledge of the
field of application. From the perspective of cyber security alert
analysis, we have several observations and recommendations on
how to improve soundness of results:
• Mining patterns in sequences of interaction between an
attacker and a target is tempting, but following only the
progress of an attacker is more rewarding. Processing only
target interactions proved inefficient and results were not
really useful.
• Including ports in the features is definitely useful, especially
whenmining patterns or rules of attacker’s activity. However,
it is more computationally demanding.
• Item intervals and other time-related criteria are useful and
allowed interesting discoveries in attack timing.
• To avoid duplicities in discovered patterns, we recommend
using some of the optimized pattern mining methods. In our
experiment, maximal sequential pattern mining filtered the
results better than other methods.
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Nevertheless, it is important to continuously keep the desired use
case and expected results in mind, especially in the cyber security
field, where the data are often incomplete and prone to false positive
alerts and other misleading information.
6.2 Future work
In our future work, we are going to inspect the incremental mining
algorithms, a prospective approach to pattern mining that continu-
ously updates the results. This approach has not yet been properly
evaluated in the cyber security field, but seems promising with
respect to peculiarities of cyber security alerts. It is generally ac-
knowledged that cyber attacks are continuously evolving, but cer-
tain patterns in attackers’ behavior may not change significantly,
thus creating a use case for incremental mining. Finally, we are
going to further inspect the serendipitously discovered patterns
and examine the behavior of attackers.
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